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When Nobel laureate Ronald Coase wrote his famous piece (Coase 1960) he
may not have realized or guessed that he was giving birth to a new exciting
field, Law and Economics. By the time Judge Posner wrote his seminal book
(Posner 1972), Law and Economics was an established field in Economics. In
the last 35 years, Law and Economics has become a central methodology in
legal scholarship. Economists have moved to law schools and shaped so many
areas of legal scholarship that now it is difficult to understand contracts, torts,
property and corporate law without being familiar with economic concepts
such as efficiency, transaction costs, principal-agent model, moral hazard and
adverse selection, among others. No matter how legal scholarship evolves in
the next 50 years, the contributions of economists will be certainly enduring
and path-breaking. The next generations of lawyers will be trained in the
economic jargon, and the judges will write decisions citing economic analysis.
Economics will be inside the courts. Economics will be part of the discourse in
legal policy making.
Obviously all of this is true in the USA. But not in Europe. Law and
economics is still very much a marginal field in economic departments and
almost ignored by the faculties of law, with some exceptions here and there.
There are structural reasons for the lack of success of economists in European
legal scholarship that cannot be easily addressed (Garoupa and Ulen 2008).
One of the standard arguments put forward by European legal scholars is
that economists use American models and American law to develop their
arguments. Although this is far from true, this special issue is yet another move
into showing how economics can inform legal policy discussions in Europe.
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The papers collected in this issue apply standard law and economic models
to recent legal reforms across Europe. The different style of each paper shows
how these models can be used in variable ways: from the more technical and
stylized model that points out to a particular trade-off that should have been
considered by legal policy makers to a more informal economic analysis that
provides a powerful and generalist critique. These different styles embody the
richness of Law and Economics methodology. They also show how economists
and lawyers can write together, using economic language, to address funda-
mental legal problems.
I have selected applications to recent legal changes in Portugal, Spain,
France, Italy and Greece. These are EU countries with traditional and long-
standing problems with their legal systems, inefficient courts and ineffective
laws. Their legal systems are simply unprepared to face the challenges posed
by globalization and the technological advancements of our modern society.
The governments of these countries have reacted late and slowly to the
shortcomings of their legal systems. Economic analysis has not penetrated
their legal thinking and, consequently, the current reform efforts have largely
not been inspired by a serious economic discussion (except when it comes to
considering budgetary costs). In that respect, this collection of papers provides
useful examples to legal policymakers across Southern Europe and France.
In the first paper, Antonio Nicita and Matteo Rizzoli look at Italian reforms
of labor law, in particular the regulation of strikes. They develop a formal
model to assess the incentives provided by “virtual strikes,” both in terms
of the goals of the workers and the losses borne by the employers. A social
welfare analysis is applied to discuss the merits of this alternative to classical
strikes. The model is used to inform current policy changes in Italy.
Bruno Deffains, Roberto Galbiati and Sebastien Rouillon also use a formal
model to address current reforms in France in the area of criminal law. They
assess the introduction of minimum mandatory penalties. They show that such
a policy might increase acquittals, and therefore dilute criminal deterrence,
thus backfiring on the governmental policy of law and order. This is a good
example of a policy change that might actually not deliver the results politicians
expect because the structure of incentives has been neglected.
In the third paper, I present a short extension of the economic model of
litigation to show that the introduction of payments upfront when legal fees
are allocated according to the English rule can actually congest courts. I argue
that the reform of legal fees designed by the Portuguese legal policymakers
is naïve in that respect. It provides a second example of a policy change that
could undermine the results announced by politicians.
The fourth paper is authored by Fernando Gómez-Pomar, Anna Ginès i
Fabrellas, and Ignacio Marín García. They look at the problems posed by
litigation where the State is the defendant. Looking at the Spanish experience,
they discuss the incentives to bring a suit and settle out-of-court when there
is a clear asymmetry of bargaining positions. Their paper provides a useful
framework to discuss the reforms of administrative courts, and the extent
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to which administrative procedure should be used to correct potential biases
favorable to the State.
The final paper is by Aristides Hatzis. In a more informal way, the author
discusses the recent changes in regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece.
He identifies a lack of economic analysis and addresses the detrimental incen-
tives created by the new law. He concludes that the prevalence of paternalism
in legal policy analysis fails to produce sensible policies in the area of family
law.
I welcome this opportunity to thank the contributors to this special issue
of the Portuguese Economic Journal for their superb work. Each paper was
delivered under very tight deadlines which were met by all contributors. The
authors and I are grateful to the seven anonymous referees for the quality and
speed of their suggestions. A final word to thank Paulo Brito for the idea and
the opportunity to have a special issue published by the Portuguese Economic
Journal on the subject of law and economics.
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